The 
I will not proceed much longer out of respect for the reader, apologising with the numerous authors I have neglected -on a par with some of the themes they have investigated. I only mention a few writings (Gui, 1987 (Gui, , 1996 Uhlaner, 1989; Zamagni, 1999) , that bring to the stage the notion of 'relational goods' -i.e. intangible entities that are inextricably associated with personalised interactions and have a bearing on their unfoldingupon which this paper is focused.
In developing the framework that I present below, I have been inspired by a brief sentence by Mark Casson, who broadens the prevailing view of economic relations by proposing that: "… the concept of a trade [be] replaced with the concept of an encounter, which can also include teamwork, public assembly, chance meetings, and so in a personal relationship", Kelley writes: "Their affective consequences derive partly from the specific rewards and costs they entail but also partly from what the events reveal about each person's underlying dispositions..." (1986, p. 12) . The expression 'communicative/affective' refers to the latter component, and the same holds for 'relational'. 4 On personal interactions and contributions to public goods see the general discussion by Bardsley (2003) . See also Bohnet and Frey (1999) . 5 For an overview of the history of the discipline from this particular viewpoint see Bruni (2003) . 6 Some authors -see for instance Fafchamps and Minten (1999) and -view social capital rather as part of an individual's human capital. Among these is Gary Becker, whose definition however turns social capital from a tool for more effective action into a conditioning on the agent's choices: " I incorporate the influences of others on a person's utility through the stock of social capital" (1996, p. 12).
on" (1991, p. 25) . 7 Indeed, I found there a suggestion for investigating human interaction in the economic sphere from a perspective that Leibenstein (1979) would call 'micro-micro', in the attempt to incorporate 'relational goods' coherently into the economic discourse. Indeed, in real life 'encounters' much more takes place than can be captured by the variables that are usually considered in economic analysis: quantities and characteristics of goods and services, property rights, financial assets, and objective information, that are contributed or received by each party. According to Foa's (1993) classification of the resources that play a role in human interaction, those above can be categorised as: goods, money, services, or information. All these are, to a greater or lesser extent, universalistic and concrete. There remain two often-disregarded categories of resources, which are rather particularistic and symbolic: status (defined as 'prestige, regard, or esteem'; see p. 15), and love (i.e. 'regard, warmth, or comfort'). Indeed, Foa's status and love categories are primary ingredients of relational goods, the rest being made of 'local' information (i.e. information that is hard to define objectively and, therefore, to transmit to persons other than direct interactants).
In the following pages, after a brief exploration of the relational side of economic interactions (Section 2), and of the alternative theoretical options for taking it into account (Section 3), I propose to view an 'encounter' as a peculiar productive process that generates, beside conventional values, 'relational' goods (Section 4). Section 5 presents some sketches of applications. A few concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
From impersonal exchange to real-life personalised interaction.
Were agents' human capital unaffected by contact with others, and the economic environment a complete set of perfect markets, personalised interaction between economic agents would be irrelevant for resource allocation: in both cases economists would be justified in neglecting interpersonal phenomena in their analyses. Indeed, these assumptions have traditionally been adopted by general equilibrium theory, which has strongly influenced how economists view their object of study. 8 Indeed, if goods are homogeneous and signed contracts are fulfilled with certainty at no cost, then each transaction is independent of other transactions (past, present, or future) and buyers are indifferent between sellers offering the same price (and viceversa). Secondly, due to centralised clearing of transactions, the only communication agents are involved in is the transmission of codified information from and to the "auctioneer". Third, agents are plunged in an all-embracing set of markets, so these price all their actions and mediate all their interactions.
Starting from such an aseptic description of economic interaction, there are three directions that bring us toward real-life interpersonal events. The first is recognition that exchanges are often complex and problematic, due to information asymmetries, goods' or services' heterogeneity, bounded rationality, spill-overs, and other market failures. Insurance, franchise, or employment contracts are eloquent examples. All this leaves ample room for transactants to communicate with each other in order to elicit or transmit information, negotiate, or enforce agreements once made. In so doing, what economists often refer to as exchanges are often transformed into fullfledged interpersonal relations. In Macnail's (1987) language, virtually all real-life contracts are to some extent "relational", an attribute that he opposes to "discrete". Relational contracts are by definition inserted in a relation, often durable, and involve "strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence..." (p. 276).
9
As seen from the viewpoint of Williamson's "transaction cost economics", real contracts are not the place of pleasant socialisation, but rather the habitat of a "contracting man [who] is given to self-interest seeking of a deeper and more troublesome kind than his economic man predecessor", i.e. to self-interest with guile (1996, p. 55-56) . However, here too man is acknowledged to be, after all, a "social animal" (p. 267), capable of trust, under certain circumstances. Furthermore, real transactants differ as to both the strength of their opportunistic tendencies and the external constraints to which such tendencies are subjected, so the identity of the parties to a contract matters (1996, p. 370) . Lastly, "the social and organisational context within which contracts are embedded" also counts (p. 275). Another perspective that stresses the diversity of most actual exchange relations from impersonal "spot" exchanges is found in those authors who emphasise the existence and the importance of intangible relationspecific capital. Becker's (1975) specific human capital is the most well-known instance: over time the worker accumulates a stock of firm-specific knowledge that has a value in both present and future production, but would 7 Later, during the revision of this paper, I came across an interesting article by the sociologist Turner (1999) , who also uses the notion of encounter and stresses the role of the emotional side in discussing economic behaviour, and found a surprising consonance in some regards between his and my own past and present work, despite lack of contact. For an early sociological analysis of encounters per se, see Goffman (1961) . 8 In a recent paper Bowles and Gintis (2000) blame just the success of the Walrasian over the Marshallian approach for the long neglect of relational and other themes that have only recently resurfaced, thanks to the behavioural and the incomplete contracts approaches. 9 On the notion of relational contracts see also Goldberg (1980) . become useless in the event of separation. Less often mentioned, but not less real, is another relation-specific capital asset: the knowledge managers acquire concerning the strenghts and weaknesses of an employee, and how these relate to the various tasks she might be assigned to.
10 Intangible relation-specific capital is also formed in connection with other recurrent transactions, e.g. between a customer and a supplier (see Ben-Porath, 1980) . The second direction is consideration of modes of carrying out transactions other than exchange. The most obvious non-market mode is administrative allocation within an authority structure that covers both the supplier and the receiver of a good or a service. 11 Another possibility is what Hansmann (1989) calls "politics". Indeed, in joint-stock companies, condominiums, co-operatives, … -important choices are left to "political" procedures, in particular collective decisions in assemblies or committees.
12 A third -albeit informal -mode of managing transactions which has received great attention in recent years is reciprocity, i.e. non-contractual voluntary transfers in cash or kind occurring within a group or a community according to a logic of fairness, solidarity, or mutual insurance. Examples are numerous in traditional economies -e.g. informal insurance (see Coate and Ravallion, 1993) , or group harvesting of individual plots (see Geschiere, 1995) ; however, reciprocity has a role to play even in modern economies. What matters here is that most often non-market transactions require face-toface interactions, so agents find themselves in highly personalised contexts where attitudes, feelings, and other relation-specific elements enter into play.
The third direction of departure from impersonal market exchange toward personalised interactions leads us to situations that, according to the usual definition of goods and services, give rise to no transaction. Consider for instance fellow-workers, who are continuously involved in chatting, listening, gossiping, explaining, deriding, encouraging, disapproving, and so on. All such interactions -that at first sight one might consider irrelevant for economic analysis -impact on two important magnitudes: employees' satisfaction, and the firm's productivity. Similarly, social interactions among neighbours who are in no way involved in veritable transactions with each other contribute to perceived quality of life and well-being (Diwan, 2000) .
How to account for the communicative/affective side of economic interactions?
If the communicative/affective side of economic interactions -that was pruned off by the Walrasian razor (despite Walras' interest for social economics) -does matters and is, therefore, worthy of consideration within economic analysis, how can it be conceptualised? Answering this question requires two steps: first, one has to define some conceptual entity that may host relational phenomena conveniently; secondly, one has to consider agents' preferences or motivations with regards to such entities. In the following I focus on the former stepwhich represents the hard part of the question. Observe that skipping this step may lead to misleading results, as it is shown by Bernheim and Stark's (1988) discussion of couple formation. For doing this they only rely on a feature of agents' preferences: altruism. This is modelled by having the utility of agent B depend, not only on her own consumption, but also on agent A's utility, and vice versa for A. This creates a passive interdependence in utilities, so, banned income transfers for simplicity, the problem of a woman who is looking for a partner consists in choosing one with whom this utility link works best from her point of view. Thus, a woman with low 'felicity' (the satisfaction derived from own characteristics) would prefer, ceteris paribus, to choose a less altruistic partner: in fact, so he will suffer less from her unhappiness, then he will be less unhappy, and therefore the negative feedback on her utility will be smaller. So we are taught that, when one is hurt by misfortune, the recipe for happiness -or for less unhappiness -is to have at one's side an unconcerned, and therefore content, partner. The disregard for the genuinely relational aspects of the situation considered is complete: the partner's sympathy, the very fact that he shares her concerns, is irrelevant for the heroines of this novel. Then, it introducing relational entities into the economic discourse cannot be avoided, how can it be designed? 10 See Prescott and Visscher (1980) and Tomer (1987) . Arrow's (1974) communication channels, team human capital (Chillemi and Gui, 1997 ) and Becker's marital-specific capital (1981) are other instances. 11 I remind that for Williamson (1996, p. 58 ) a transaction occurs when that "... good or service is trasferred across a technologically separable interface". 12 Interestingly, the famous institutionalist John Commons proposed to categorize transactions into "Bargaining, Managerial, and Rationing transactions": "... the transfer of legal control is the outcome of a Bargaining Transaction ... the assumption back of Managerial transactions is that of superior and inferior. One person is a legal superior who has legal rights of issuing commands. ... Rationing transactions ... are the negotiations of reaching an agreement among several participants who have authority to apportion the benefits and burdens to members of a joint enterprise (1934, Sect. I.(II) .2). p. 58). I thank Antonin Wagner for bringing Commons' work to my attention.
Not only externalities or goods' characteristics.
The first notion that comes to the mind of an economist when dealing with non-contracted-upon influences of an agent's behaviour on other agents is the notion of externality. And rightly so. Indeed, one can identify quite a long list of 'interpersonal externalities', i.e. externalities that -unlike pollutants that reach their victims through the atmosphere, or cars whose bodies obstruct the passage of other travellers -do not operate through physical mediums, but rather through interpersonal communication (both verbal and visual), or emotional links.
13 Beside 'positional externalities' (Frank, 1991) and 'human capital externalities' (Borjas, 1995) , that have been hinted at above, one can mention the additional satisfaction that spectators derive from a sport event in the presence of a large enthusiastic audience (Rothschild and White, 1995) , or from a dinner at a restaurant if customers sitting at other tables create a lively atmosphere (Becker, 1991) , or else if a large share of these belongs to the desirable type (a 'type-specific externality'; see Corneo and Jeanne, 1999a) . However, there is more to personalised interactions than the notion of an externality can adequately catch. This notion is most useful when the unpaid/uncompensated effects on other agents are unintentional, a by-product of actions having other main purposes.
14 Indeed, I do not find it illuminating to call externality a punch on the nose of a rival, or the secret poisoning of some of the cans sold by a competitor, despite these actions satisfy the condition that the affected party was not consenting to them -the only condition for having an externality, according to some definitions 15 . Coming to an example more relevant for our discussion, take a wealthy manager chatting about her yacht in the presence of a penniless unnoticed clerk. The fact that the listener may feel humiliated is typically an externality: the presence or absence of the clerk would neither add to nor detract from the value of the conversation for the manager, in the same way as the presence or absence of damaged inhabitants in the vicinity of a polluting plant would not affect its profitability, as long as the externality remain such, i.e. no internalisation mechanism is at work. However, if the manager is speaking at a portable phone and, upon celebrating her yacht, she walks closer to the clerk so this can listen, or else if she directly addresses the clerk, expressing a positive or negative judgement about the accomplishment of a task, the logic of these actions stand outside the range of fruitful application of the notion of externality: the clerk's presence and attention are indispensable for the action having its full value, or in other works the clerk is no more an 'external party'.
Another suggestion that I have received for capturing the communicative/affective aspects of economic interactions is recourse to the notion of goods' characteristics. This notion is certainly appropriate, for instance, in the case of a shopkeeper counseling a customer with good manners: the intensity of this 'service' can indeed differentiate dresses bought in that shop from identical dresses bought in a department store with nearly no employees around. However, in some interactions, e.g. among colleague workers, no (even implicit) sale of goods occurs; and, secondly, in many instances communicative-affective entities are not 'supplied' by one party and 'consumed' by the other, but are 'produced' with the contribution of both parties and at the same time 'consumed' by both. (Indeed, despite its unpleasant sound, the right expression to be used would be 'prosumed'; see Toffler, 1980.) 
Extending the exchange paradigm.
Another option that comes immediately to the economist's mind for conceptualising the communicative/affective side of personal interactions in economic terms is to extend the definition of a good to include such entities as a pleasant message, a story told during a boring wait, a nice smile (and, similarly, to include among bads nasty invectives and other unpleasant communicative acts). In such a way the communicative/affective side of an interaction would be likened to a set of transfers of unusual 'articles of trade'. Taken literally, this option sounds a bit naive, as it crystallises as 'goods' entities the meaning of which crucially depends on the context and on irreducibly subjective elements. Not surprisingly, the authors who describe human interaction as 'social exchange', 16 -or, like Uriel Foa (1993) , 'interpersonal exchange' -first of all interpret the expression 'exchange' loosely, as a non-contractual 13 A related expression which lends itself more directly to distinction from "physical externalities" is "social externalities". Unfortunately, its meaning is not univocal: see for instance Preston (1989) , and Grilo and Thisse (1999) . Bénabou (1996, p. 237 ) prefers the expression "sociological spillovers". 14 Although there is no agreement among scholars as to the role that intentionality should play in the definition of externalities, I strongly support the position of Connolly and Munro, who, on commenting their own definition of externalities, clearly state: "It also excludes situations where the damage (or gain) is deliberate, or where one agent fully internalises the consequences of his or her actions. In both these cases, the chooser decides his or her actions having regard to the effect on the other person or persons involved" (1999, ch. 5) . 15 An example is Meade's definition (1973) , quoted by Cornes and Sandler (1986, p. 29) . 16 Among economists who have utilised the notion of social exchange see: Chadwick-Jones (1986), Gaechter and Fehr (1999) , and Hollander (1990) . combination of reciprocal contributions. Secondly, they refer to the intangible items being traded-off, not as individual acts objectively described -in fact a bow, a smile, or the sentence "you are the best", all of which could express deference or sympathy, but also derision -but, rather, as sets of acts collectively identified by their interpersonal meaning (recognition of status, manifestation of affection, ….).
17
Indeed, the social exchange approach helps to understand economic phenomena like the implicit barter -money against gratitude and care -that is hidden behind apparently unilateral intergenerational transfers that occur within families (see Cox and Rank, 1992) . However, the exchange analogy also reveals important limitations. First of all, it turns the light toward the private-good component of acts that make up personal interaction, and so throws into the shade important shared-benefit and public-good components that are also present. Indeed, it often happens that the benefit (damage) stemming from personal interaction is not only shared among direct interactants, but also spills over on other agents that are in some way associated with the former. A typical example is the depressing effect exerted by a quarrel between two workers on the human atmosphere of a workplace. Secondly, the idea of social or interpersonal exchange depicts agents entering a -suppose -dyadic interaction as having an endowment of resources that are then, in the course of the exchange, transferred to (or spent to the benefit of) the other interactant. In such a way the exchange paradigm obscures the fact that personal interaction generates something that did not exist before, and that the interactants play the role of co-producers of this something. (By the way, a similar disregard of co-production characterises the usual understanding of many service activities; for instance we usually classify consulting as the sale of a service -i.e. as a mere exchange -despite the fact that a company restructuring plan is typically the outcome of co-operation between personnel of the client company and consultants).
Personal interaction as a productive process generating relational goods.
Given the inadequacies of the alternative theoretical options explored so far, I suggest to follow another route for conceptualising economic interactions having a communicative/affective component: to view this component neither as a spill-over, nor as a set of transfers of intangible entities; but rather as a set of peculiar outputscalled 'relational goods' -generated by a 'productive' process called 'encounter'.
18
Examples of encounters are: an estate agent and a customer engaged in a deal, a physician visiting a patient, a foreman explaining a new task to a worker, a non-profit entrepreneur and a wealthy philanthropist examining a new project, a board meeting, a group of clerks chatting in a corridor. A common characteristic of all these examples is face-to-face interaction, that is almost a defining element of an encounter. Other forms of interaction -in particular teleconferences and telephone, that entail simultaneity -can also be seen as encounters, albeit with different 'productive technologies' -in particular different as to the generation of relational goods.
19
Communication via e-mail or letter also have some of the elements that make up an encounter. Since describing and giving examples of relational goods is a more delicate matter, I will do it later. The next section presents a description of encounters as productive processes.
The anatomy of encounters.
17 Quite similar is the position taken by Corneo and Jeanne (1999b) and Pettit (1995) , despite they do not speak of 'social exchange'. The former authors state: "The set of goods consumed by agents … also includes many … goods that are directly obtained by people from their own social environment. ... Examples include ... receiving deference, sympathy, approval, and courtesy. ...[s]uch goods are not allocated by the market but through a process of social interaction ... " (1999b, pp. 711-712) . Pettit interestingly distinguishes between conventional services, that he dubs 'action-dependent goods', and "… goods... like being loved, being liked, being acknowledged, being respected, being admired", that he calls 'attitude-dependent '. 18 This acceptation of the term encounter is aligned with its use in marketing literature, where the expression "service encounter" is defined as "the dyadic interaction between a customer and a service provider" (see Bitner et al., 1990 , and the literature cited). Although on the provider side there is more to the service encounter than personnel behaviour (facilities and procedures also enter into play), usually the focus is on the personal interaction between employees and customers. 19 It is Robert Sugden (2001 Sugden ( , 2003 who utilises this analogy with reference to the generation of relational goods. To this end he re-examines the Smithian notion of 'fellow-feeling': for people engaged in an interaction the very correspondence of sentiments is in itself a source of pleasure, or relief. Indeed, the encounter approach seems suitable to accounting for fellow-feeling, as it reserves a place for affective-level interaction. He also notices that fellow-feeling is not confined to personal affairs, but has organisational implications, as some activities that, technically speaking, can be carried out equally well in isolation, are made less burdensome by being performed together (for instance repetitive working tasks, and coping with unforeseen problems).
Conventional and unconventional "outputs" and the "inputs" of an encounter.
The most obvious outcomes -or 'outputs' -of an encounter are:
O1) a transfer of property rights (for instance the sale of a house, in the estate agent example; but also a donation from the philanthropist to the non-profit organisation headed by the entrepreneur); O2) the provision of a service (e.g. the physician's diagnosis); O3) the performance of a task within an organisation (a collective decision, in the example of the management board; the implementation of a plan, in the case of the job assignment).
All of these can be called, broadly speaking, transactions (see for instance Williamson, 1996, p. 58) . As the transaction cost literature has made it clear, in order to be brought into being transactions require the employment of some inputs. These can be divided in the following two large classes.
I1) Ordinary goods and services.
Examples are: transportation and telecommunication services; the use of a meeting room; and legal advice about a contract's clauses.
I2) Interactants' human inputs.
These can be seen as flows of services of interactants' stocks of human capital, and therefore depend, in both quantity and quality, on the stocks themselves, and the intensity of their use, i.e. time devoted and effort exerted. Here human capital is understood very broadly, so as to include: personal characteristics, such as physical appearance or psychic strength; the accumulation of previous investments in education and work experience; behavioural habits, convictions, tastes, general interpersonal skills; charisma, status, and reputation.
20
In the following I will try hard to stick to a 'technological' conception of capital, according to which it represents a collection of entities that can exert an appreciable effect, i.e. modify quantity or quality of some outputs, in some productive process -in the case at hand, some types of encounters -over an extended period of time. This will allow us to keep the notion of capital distinct from the notion of an asset -which instead is defined as a property or other claim that ensures its owner an expected stream of revenues or benefits -despite the fact that most entities that qualify for the former definition also satisfy the latter, and vice-versa.
21
The reason for keeping this distinction is that in encounters both co-operation and conflict take place, in nonobvious blends. So in general an input contributed by one party can be targeted not at increasing the 'size of the pie', but at enlarging her own share, possibly at the cost of the pie shrinking. Take the legal advice example: in some cases the aim of the lawyer's client is a smoother post-contractual relation, with beneficial effects for both parties; in others, instead, the aim can be expropriation of the opponent, a privately beneficial manoeuvre that at the same time is likely to reduce social surplus through greater litigation costs.
22
The same occurs with interactants' human stocks. For instance, within the class of relation-specific information, knowledge by the salesman of the customer's preferences may benefit both parties, as it can direct the former's efforts straight to the items the latter is most interested in; however, a salesman who knows that a customer is unaware of competitors' offers, can successfully attempt at selling at above-market prices. In other words, some pieces of relation-specific capital represent an asset for the interactants taken as a whole (i.e. seen as a cooperating team); others instead, are such for individual parties (i.e. they are private assets).
23 Which item falls 20 This acceptation of human capital brings together elements mentioned in different contexts by various authors who have discussed personal aspects of interactions. In particular: Cauley and Sandler (1980) include personal characteristics among the capital inputs of a couple's household production function which supplies final commodities (such as "respect, warmth, knowledge, and inspiration"), which then enter the utility functions of at least one of the two; Becker (see, for instance, 1996, Introduction) includes into human capital 'personal consumer capital', that is behind the agent's apparent tastes; define an individual's social capital as "the individual's social characteristics -including status, charisma and access to networks -that enable that person to extract private returns from interactions with others". 21 According to this technological conception a machinery can be called capital if it is capable of performing a certain productive function, despite the fact that e.g. lack of legal permission forbids its actual use, thus reducing or zeroing its value as an asset. 22 Another example is a luxurious country cottage freed by one party for holding there a meeting: its comfort may facilitate communication, but the guest may also feel inferior, and therefore behave differently than in another context -an effect which may be the main purpose of the host's offer. 23 Just to sketch a physical analogy, a typical relation-specific capital good for two parties is a pipeline that connects the plant of a producer (firm A) and the tanks of a user of a chemical product (firm B). Imagine that the into which category does not only depend on its nature, but on interactants' intentions: an altruistic agent may assign zero value to an information that would bring her a certain benefit, but would confer the other party a much greater damage; instead, were a selfish agent in the former's shoes, that information might be highly valuable. Observe that a piece of information may also represent a 'relational liability' for an interactant. An example is when the memory of an unpleasant event occurred in the past in the presence of a certain person is revived by the sight of that person, so fruitful interaction with her is heavily hindered.
24
In conclusion, specification of how they are directed is a necessary step for viewing human stocks as assets promising certain streams of revenues or benefits to one or other of the parties involved: who is a piece of relation-specific capital an asset for, is not at all obvious.
25
Consider now a pair of agents and a collection of human capital goods specific to the relation between them, that represents an asset for both (take for instance two lawyers with complementary skills, that possess abundant local information about each other and share friendly feelings, so their professional partnership is more profitable than another composed of two equally skilled replacements). This asset is liable to the usual drawbacks of public goods. Take in particular individual mobility decisions, that drastically reduce the future flow of returns from relation-specific capital, not only for those who move -who are in a position to weigh what they are losing against the benefits brought about by the move -but also for those who stay (be they colleagues, relatives, or neighbours). Compensation of stayers is conceivable, but seldom implementable for a host of reasons. 26 This makes it possible that each agent sees moving as an improvement, but at the same time the welfare of everybody drops (see Schiff, 2002) .
In order to improve our understanding of encounters, in particular their communicative/affective side, two additional categories of outputs are to be considered: O4) changes in interactants' human capital, in particular its relation-specific component; O5) 'relational' goods 'consumed' in the course of the interaction. This will be done in the next two subsections.
The accumulation/decumulation of relation-specific human capital.
Interactants' human capital is modified by encounters in several ways. Most prominently, in nearly all interactions there is a passage of information from one interactant to another, or the generation of new information through their dialogue. Some of the information acquired by one party during an encounter will be effective in individual future activities, or in encounters with many other parties. An obvious example is a foreman giving a mixture of orders and instructions to a junior worker, so the latter obtains knowledge of widely used techniques, as a side effect of being assigned a job to accomplish (and conversely, the foreman may also learn something from a smart objection raised by the worker). The acquisition of such information is then to be classified as a change in interactants' general human capital. 27 flow is regulated by two successive taps, the former under the control of a technician charged of optimising the operation of the whole complex, and the latter under the control of A. The former tap increases the value of the pipeline -and therefore represents an asset -for the two parties taken together, since it allows adaptation of the flow to the pursuit of the highest possible joint surplus. Instead, the second tap is a private asset for firm A: it increases its bargaining power, and therefore allows firm A to extract a greater share of the joint surplus from the pipeline. But efforts by firm B to protect itself from exploitation are likely to reduce the joint surplus. 24 Similarly, an affective bond (that can also be seen as a relation-specific capital, as it will be discussed below), can as well represent a liability. Examples are exclusive forms of camaraderie, e.g. among members of an ethnic minorities, that hinder tacit learning from other colleagues; and psychological dependence from a charismatic superior, that may prevents an executive from taking autonomous initiatives. 25 Notice that third parties may also gain (or lose) from an encounter. Apart from government -the invisible share-holder of most economic activities, thanks to taxation -a typical example of an external stake-holder to an encounter is the employer with regard to social interactions among her employees: these may have a significant productive impact, which is not usually offset by equivalent changes in compensations. See for instance: Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) , who discuss the splitting between a firm's owners and workers of the excess productivity created by workers' ability to co-operate effectively; with reference to social clubs, Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) suggests that a possible individual owner would end up appropriating the value of personal bonds created over time by members themselves. 26 In particular, asymmetric information and reluctance to having recourse to contracts in social relationships. 27 That information possessed by an actor can be seen as a stock which is modified by new messages, is affirmed for instance by Hirschleifer and Riley (1992, p. 167) . Notice that, by including among the outputs of an encounter both the provision of a service and the change in interactants' state of information, there is a danger of double counting. This holds in particular in the case of Instead, when the information learned by one party in an encounter will only be effective in future encounters with the same interactant, it constitutes 'relation-specific human capital' (or more simply 'relational capital').
28
Indeed, this capital is made, first of all, of information. One can distinguish between: i) 'local' information about B possessed by A; ii) viceversa, 'local' information about A possessed by B; iii) information which is common knowledge for those specific interactants, but not others (an example is the ability of a tried pair of engineers charged of dangerous repairs to coordinate their actions in emergencies; another is mutual trust between two businessmen involved in a complex contractual relationship, i.e. the shared conviction that, should an unanticipated event occur, both will react co-operatively). These pieces of information affect the ability of interactants to derive outputs of the various types from an encounter.
29
The second component of relation-specific human capital is A's 'state of feelings' toward B (for instance sympathy towards him or her), and viceversa. This inclusion captures the well-recognised fact that interactants' feelings toward one another impinge on an encounter's outcomes (e.g. reciprocal resentments obstruct interactive decision-making processes), and stresses that these feelings have an inertial component. That relation-specific human capital is an outcome of past encounters is self-evident. Indeed, local information on a customer (e.g. regarding his behavioural habits) is revealed, by definition, in interactions, and accumulates with the salesman; similarly, reciprocal feelings are largely moulded in interactions (so a quarrel among colleagues occurred in one circumstance may cause long-lasting mutual dislike -a 'decumulation' of reciprocal feelings).
30
As I remarked above, general human capital is also affected by past encounters.
31 However, as the number of events affecting human capital specific to one particular relationship is much smaller than those affecting general human capital, it is especially on the former that one single encounter can exert a noteworthy impact. This is why in this paper I put more stress on relation-specific than on general human capital. However, between specificity of human capital to a two-person relation and full generality there exists a wide spectrum of intermediate cases, i.e. specificity to a small group. An example is the greater productivity -with respect to a group of workers who are individually equally skilled and experienced -that a work team can acquire over time, thanks, for instance, to the development of a specialised jargon, so brief expressions convey shared meanings, dispensing group members from long explanations and costly misunderstandings (see Chillemi and Gui, 1997 , who speak of 'team-human capital'). Enlarging the numerosity of the group causes the notion of relational capital to overlap with the notion of 'social capital', which -in its prevalent 'meso-economic' usage -refers to a collection of intangible durable resources that are specific to a community: the respect of norms of co-operation (which requires, first of all, the knowledge of the norm, and, secondly, a convergence of beliefs that it will be followed); mutual familiarity and trust among members of networks along which information flows easily (so search costs are contained); and so on. Indeed, social capital and what I call relational capital are made of roughly the same 'substance'. There are authors -like Turner (1999) -who refer to the latter as a micro-level instance of the former. My using the adjective 'relational' -rather than the more generic 'social' -in reference to both consumption and capital goods associated with dyadic or small group interactions, is for emphasising the peculiarity of face-to-face encounters -in particular the significance of the affective component.
4.3.
'Relational' goods 'consumed' in the course of the interaction.
Consider a member of an association drawing a balance of a meeting of the steering committee on her way home: the decisions she was most interested in may have been delayed; she may have obtained no valuable services like education or training, that largely consist of the very transmission of information. Now, a bit of care permits to obviate this problem; however, all this suggests that including changes in human capital among encounters' outputs is important in all the other cases, when the fact that interactants are learning something new is not formally recognised, and therefore is at risk of being overlooked. 28 This expression 'relational capital' is being used by more and more authors, both in the business management and in the economics literature (see for instance Frijters, 2000) . 29 Another example is a physician who possesses more local information (i.e. information which can hardly be codified and transferred to others) about a specific patient, so on average can make a better or quicker diagnosis than another equally skilled physician who also has access to the patient's written records. 30 See for instance van Dijk and van Winden (1997) , who treat an agent's altruism toward one's opponent in a contribution game as a state variable which is modified over time by the latter's behaviour. Sacco and Vanin (2000) also study a repeated game and consider -for each couple of players -their 'relational intensity', which varies over time according to the outcomes of their interactions; they also refer to an aggregate measure of relational intensities in a network of interactants as the 'relational capital' of the network. 31 Besides information, an instance worth mentioning is a possible damage to an interactant's psychological health.
information from listening to the others; still, she may have liked that the discussion went on correctly and amicably, and enjoyed the opportunity to talk with fellow members during the breaks.
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Or take a elderly person who spends the morning at a neighbourhood market, chatting with sellers and other customers. The outputs of the series of encounters she carries out include some purchases, the information she obtains concerning prices or new products, and the maintenance of some personal relationships. However, the very fact that she is engaged in conversations, and the quality of these conversations, may have a significant direct impact on her quality of life, independently of the value of those other 'outputs'. These examples are tuned to the statement by Kenneth Arrow that "much of the reward from social interaction is intrinsic" (1999, p. 3). In other words, one of the outcomes of social interaction does not reside in what it can be instrumental to (advantageous transactions, or the accumulation of human capital of any sort), but in what is enjoyed (or suffered, if the communicative/affective side of the interaction is unpleasant) during the interaction itself, a peculiar form of 'consumption'. I refer to this (otherwise unaccounted for) class of outputs of encounters as 'relational consumption goods'. 33 (Although in some instances 'relational consumption bads' would be a more appropriate expression, most of the time I will stick to 'goods', and admit that they may be disliked by one or more interactants). I recognise that recourse to the consumption paradigm in reference to the intrinsic value of human interaction is reductive. In fact, interpersonal communication is not just a source of pleasure or grief, but is a key experience through which we grow as humans. Indeed, I fully agree with Julie Nelson's (1994, p. 128) statement that "affiliation with other persons … is not just a choice issue, or a feel-OK issue, but rather a developmental necessity .. a psychological necessity for full human functioning". The next step is asking, as she does, how can the recognition that interpersonal relations have this extra merit affect economic theorising? The modest answer to this great question that I implicitly give in this paper is granting interpersonal relations a non-secondary place in our conceptualisation of economic processes. I hope that better ones will come. In front of the examples of relational goods presented above, the reader might just be doubtful as to whether they should really become the object of economic investigation. In fact, one could say, the association's committee example lies at the margins of what we usually consider 'economic'; and, as far as the neighbourhood market example is concerned, most economic agents, those who produce and spend most of a nation's income, have much else to do during their mornings! As a matter of fact, for most people encounters in the economic sphere represent a large fraction of social interactions, so the amount and quality of relational goods consumed in one or other of the circumstances that make up of this sphere must matter. It is not hard to find empirical evidence in support of this statement. A privileged field is work environments. The literature on mobbing, bullying, and sexual or racial harassment provides extreme examples in this regard. For instance, according to Shields and Price (2002) , colleagues' interpersonal behaviour appears to rank high among the determinants of quit intentions and job satisfaction/dissatisfaction of nurses in British hospitals (see also the survey by Einarsen, 1999) . Relational consumption goods/bads also result from interactions between service providers, in particular employees, and clients: indeed the quality of such interactions also affect job satisfaction, and consequently, effort, absenteeism, and turnover, as well (see the empirical analysis by Borzaga and DePedri, 2003; see Shields and Price, 2002 , also in this regard). Furthermore, according to Adelman et al. (1987) , for urban citizens the psychological importance of personalised interactions connected with the purchase of services is much greater than their apparently trivial content would lead one to hold. The presence of relational consumption goods (or bads) in an economic interaction can be identified through an easy mental test. Compare a personalised interaction with an unmanned procedure (real or fictitious) that secures agent A the same objective outputs, with exactly the same objective characteristics (be they prices, timing, location, quality,…). Examples are: being served by an automatic coffee machine, rather than by a barman with whom one can comment about recent sports events; being instructed by a software package, rather than by a colleague worker; or being nursed in an hospital bed by a smart robot, rather than by a human. Let us assume, for better comparability: that the two procedures also ensure agent A the same pieces of information (imagine for instance that the coffee machine's loudspeaker pronounces the same sentences the barman would have said); and furthermore, that no accumulation of human capital occurs. We can imagine that in such circumstances sometimes the manned procedure will be preferred by agent A, sometimes the unmanned (this is the case, for instance, if the barman's curiosity is bothersome). What interests us here, in fact, is that usually agents As are not indifferent between the two procedures, and sometimes value one of them much more than the other. The entities responsible for that divergence are just relational consumption goods! Having thus given on idea of what the notion of relational goods intends to catch, I turn to discussing a few subtle questions concerning this notion. First of all, is it theoretically justified that the entities described above -generated the way they are, within personalised interactions -be regarded as goods consumed by participants in the encounter, rather than more generically 'spill-overs'? Among the implicit requirements for this attribution, the one that is hardest to satisfy in the case at hand is probably that the candidate entity be liable to be conceived (or defined) independently of the impact that its consumption exerts on consumers (or beneficiaries). This requirement is unproblematic for a material good like butter or even for a service like nursing care: the former can be seen, touched, weighted, etc.; the latter cannot, but at least can be described (e.g in written form, possibly with the help of figures) as a set of actions that can in principle be accomplished on any patient. In the case of relational goods, instead, the communicative/affective occurrences that make up relational consumption goods are inextricably tied to the personality of interactants. This makes them an irreducibly idiosyncratic 'something'. Still, one can conceptually distinguish the emotions experienced and mutually communicated in an encounter from the evaluation of those emotions by interactants. (For instance, a subordinate worker asking for a further exception to current rules may perceive some contempt behind the superior's reaction, but weigh this unpleasant feeling much less than the concession of a day off; another worker in exactly the same situation may weigh it much more, to the point of refusing.) This thin distinction between affections experienced on the one hand, and their appreciation by the persons affected on the other -the former considered as 'relatively' objective, the latter subjective (as it is common in the conventional economic theory of consumption) -allows us to extend the notion of good to the communicative/affective side of personalised interactions without -I hope -blame of inappropriate use, and then to employ it, when this is helpful, to discuss interpersonal events. Secondly, in order to keep the meaning of the expression 'relational consumption goods' as precise as possible I propose that the adjective 'relational' be only used in a predicative, not an attributive sense: for an entity to be called such it is not enough that it be connected with personal relations, it must be made of a relational (i.e. communicative/affective) 'substance'. 34 So, resisting a temptation that is widespread among those who find the notion of relational goods insightful, I suggest not to call relational good a department party in which each participant brings some food. I would rather view it as an encounter where among its various outputs -these include the implicit food exchange between participants, and the possible changes in their human capital -a prominent role is occupied by the 'good company' (hopefully) enjoyed by participants (this is the relational consumption good!). 35 Similarly, in the nursing of a patient, or the tutoring of a pupil, the communicative/affective outcome of the interaction is important, but can -and sometimes must -be distinguished neatly from the provision of health care or teaching services. (However, distinct does not mean unrelated: the quality of teaching, measured in terms of notions learned by the pupil, may be boosted by a playful atmosphere during tutoring.) Thirdly, what kind of goods are relational consumption goods? Are they (local) public goods? For arguing that they are Carole Uhlaner (1989) uses as a criterion the fact that they affect two or more persons at the same time. Examples that clearly support this position are not hard to find. Beside the example above of the 'air' breathed by partecipants at the department dinner, another is a group of clients in the waiting room of a physician or a barber shop: the possible chilly silence (broken from time to time by an embarrassed cough), as well as a relaxed atmosphere in which some people chat quietly while others read, are 'consumed' by all those present. In reference to these examples, acceptance of Uhlaner's theoretical placing of relational consumption goods is favoured by interactants being more than two, their roles identical, and their appraisal of the event symmetrical. Instead, intuition is less clear when the interactants are just two, they play different roles, and the affective impact of the interaction is strongly asymmetric -as when during an encounter a superior rebukes an inferior, so the latter feels humiliated, while the former may feel gratified by reaffirmation of her power. Indeed, application of the criterion of good publicness that focuses on non rivalry to the communicative/affective output of such an encounter, is not straightforward, because of both agent asymmetry and jointness between production and consumption.
36 Still, relational consumption goods are in the nature of public goods, albeit of a peculiar sort: their publicness consists not so much in non-rivalry as in the impossibility of disjoining consumption by one person from simultaneous consumption by another. (In fact, being in each other's presence is indispensable for 34 Observe for comparison that in Hirsch's (1976) use of the expression positional goods, the adjective 'positional' has an attributive sense (otherwise a prestigious mansion could not be such, but only power or prestige would). 35 A (remediable) danger of double counting also exists with regard to relational consumption goods, in particular when the service one party purchases includes social support or entertainment (obvious examples are psychotherapy and disk jockeys hired in private parties). 36 Even assessing non excludability -an accessory criterion usually combined with the previous one -is controversial here: while it can be possible to exclude someone from an encounter at all, in general it is impossible to exclude those involved from 'consuming' possible additional communicative/affective outputs being produced within the encounter (a sort of non-excludability along the intensive margin). their production, but production and consumption are simultaneous.) Instead, that some consumers like it, while others dislike it, is not a definite objection to a good being considered public (this also happens in reference to more conventional public goods such as a modern sculpture in a square, or a sketch by a comedian). As an immediate consequence of their being in the nature of public goods, relational consumption goods are subject to market failure, but with two special features. First of all, complete free-riding is not possible. In fact, in order for an individual to consume the relational goods generated in an encounter she has to contribute at least some of the resources needed for its production: a spell of her time -the duration of the encounter, gross of transportation and other preparation -coupled with the effort needed for interacting with others. Of course, as to who bears the costs of other inputs, free-riding continues to be a possibility. In the department dinner example, free-riding may occur as to buying or cooking food, or to transportation to the meeting place. Still, in these cases social incentives may make up for the scarcity of economic incentives. The categories of costs that are hardest to be shared include those related to devising, promoting, and organising the event, as well as taking responsibility for unplanned occurrences: first of all they are hard to define and quantify, and, secondly, the very fact of measuring -not to mention bargaining -conflicts with the spirit of fellowship that should characterise a friendly meeting. This remark introduces us to the second feature of relational goods that makes them specially vulnerable to the 'tragedy of commons'. Even if one interactant were willing to pay for all the resources altogether devoted to an encounter -remember that these include fellow interactants' human resources -an adequate supply would not swiftly follow: relational goods are to some extent non-contractible, as favourable reciprocal dispositions -that are key ingredients of the communicative/affective side of an interaction -cannot be effectively secured through monetary incentives (on this see Ng, 1975) .
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The examples presented up to this point refer to encounters that either have an explicit economic content (a transaction), or anyway occur in a context that everybody regards as economic (a firm, a market,…). However, economics cannot totally disregard relational consumption goods that are generated in non-economic contexts, even in the absence of transactions: for instance in informal gatherings of friends, or in family or associational life. The reason is that the frequency and characteristics of these encounters are significantly influenced by choices that fall within the economic domain, in particular working time schedules and occupational mobility.
On the relations between relational consumption goods and relational capital
First of all a remark about the vocabulary adopted above. The distinction between communicative/affective outputs being 'consumed' within interactions, on the one hand, and relational capital that is first accumulated and then put to use in further interactions, on the other, was introduced in Gui (2000) , where I reserved the expression 'relational goods' to the former. While reaffirming the value of the distinction, now I find it more convenient that 'relational good' may span both -so they can be jointly identified by a common name -and that specification of whether it is a consumption or a capital good be left to a subsequent refinement. In favour of this option stands the fact that there are expressions that are used with reference to both. Take for instance 'a good interpersonal climate', a phrase that is liable to be utilised with reference to both a positive relational atmosphere enjoyed during a one-off event (a relational consumption good), and a somewhat durable feature of a workplace, built up over time through organisational action and/or personal effort by the foreman and the other workers (a relational capital good). So, the choice of vocabulary I am advocating aligns in this regard the expression 'relational goods' to, for instance, the more conventional 'public goods', that is referred to both a park and an open air concert in that park, despite the former is a capital good and the latter a consumption good. Up to now, in considering the role of relational capital within an encounter, I have only explicitly mentioned its impact on transaction costs -e.g. reducing the requirement of ordinary inputs for successful completion. We must add, however, that relational capital also impacts on the generation of relational consumption goods. A straightforward example is an encounter between a client and a service provider -e.g. a therapist, or a lawyer: that the two parties are acquainted and sympathise with each other may help transform a dull duty into a lively dialogue. 38 In other words, relational capital is also instrumental to the achievement of intrinsic benefits from interactions.
In order to sum up and clarify the connection between relational consumption goods and relational capital, 37 After observing that activities with important positive spillovers, like socialising with neighbours, are inefficiently scarce in economically advanced countries -so taxes or subsidies on such activities should in principle exert favourable effects on welfare -Yew-Kwang Ng (1975) warns immediately that this is a precluded route: in these matters "the imposition of control or encouragement tends to defeat its very purpose". Indeed, the mere suspect that the true reason behind informal social interaction may be a subsidy would change the meaning and value of these activities dramatically. 38 Of course, relationships among customers may also enter into play (this is most evident in the case of bars or barber shops).
consider an analogous connection drawn from the realm of 'tangibles', that between outings and footpaths. Outings are events 'pro-sumed' by country-lovers -we might call them 'recreational consumption goods', for establishing a closer parallel. The list of inputs employed for 'producing' an outing includes time, effort, use of sport equipment, but also the utilisation of footpaths to cut across the bush. As footpaths provide recreational benefits over extended periods of time, we can legitimately call them 'recreational capital goods'. However, observe that, footpaths also provide non-recreational benefits, i.e. benefits other than facilitating outings (e.g. they facilitate the transportation of timber), in the same way as relational capital also provide non-relational benefits, i.e. benefits other that favouring the generation of relational consumption goods (in particular, they help in conducting transactions). Indeed, unlike relational consumption goods, relational capital is only partly of a communicative/affective nature, the rest being made of information. Last, in the same way as relational capital is modified by successive encounters, a footpath is to some extent modified by successive outings, as the passage of a group of hikers can damage it (e.g. unsteady stones may be displaced), but also keep it up (e.g. by hindering the growth of impeding foliage).
Affecting factors
In order to complete the description of the productive process occurring in an encounter, two classes of 'affecting factors' are to be considered. Not surprisingly, the outcomes of an encounter are influenced by A1) the external environment. To begin with, the unfolding of other interactions taking place all around exerts an obvious conditioning effect. This is well illustrated by job search theory, which describes wage setting and unemployment as the outcomes of a large number of firm-worker encounters, each ending either in further search or in the signing of a labor contract, the conditions of which cannot diverge much from those of the comparable labour contracts to which the two parties could aspire. Notice, however, that, on its turn, each encounter exerts an influence on the external environment. Indeed, a community's social capital can be seen as the result of myriads of encounters among its members. The external environment also includes features of the organisational or societal structure that put one interactant in a position of inferiority or superiority toward another. Indeed, despite the most obvious reference is to interactions among peers or independent transactors, the approach presented here also encompasses situations in which power plays a role (see in this regard Gazier and This, 2003) . Other environmental influences have to do with laws, culture, and habits.
The second affecting factor is: A2) Interactants' attitudes and moods. The role of this item in the framework I am proposing is to complement the interactants' reciprocal 'state of feelings' in the determination of the actual ends pursued -consciously or unconsciously -in an encounter. Indeed, besides the affective legacy of past events, a host of transitory motives enter personal interactions, with intensities depending on momentary inner states. Among them: the desire of self-affirmation, the search for social approval, and the desire to behave according to values and ideals. Interestingly, actors can exercise some influence upon these motives through immediate efforts to control one's attitudes. 39 Indeed, as already said, intentional elements affect the outcomes of encounters by orientating the contribution of an interactant's inputs to, for instance, the maximisation of the parties' joint surplus rather than one's own gain, or else the encouragement rather than the humiliation of an inferior, and so on. Intentions have not been given great attention within microeconomics, sometimes because their content was considered obvious (maximisation of a self-regarding utility function), sometimes because their variability was deemed either to be irrelevant in front of market competition, or to constitute a "white noise" disturbance. Only recently have some economic models included intentions -as interpreted by opponents -among the elements influencing the outcome of a strategic situation (see : Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2001 ). The 'production' process taking place in an encounter can then be portrayed as in Figure 1 . The upper row of boxes represents categories of inputs, or their determinants. In each box dotted lines separate resources supplied by Agent A from those supplied by Agent B (in the case of non-human resources -the left box -the possibility is also considered that some inputs are contributed by third parties; instead, in the box representing relation- 39 Notice that psychological or spiritual training, that is spreading among businessmen, can enhance self-control abilities. 40 See also Fred Hirsch, who points out that a crucial component of the quality of a service such as nursing care is the sincerity of caring attitudes that patients identify behind doctors ' and nurses' objective behaviour (1976, p. 86) . specific human capital -the one to the right -the possibility is considered that some items be jointly attributed to both interactants, in particular local information that is common knowledge for them). The two ovals (on the centre-left and the centre-right, respectively) symbolise the two sets of affecting factors (environmental and motivational) that condition the unfolding of the encounter. The lower row of boxes stands for the five categories of outputs: the three types of transactions, changes in interactants' human capital -both general and relationspecific -and relational consumption goods. The relation-specific component of the change in human capital together with relational consumption goods constitute the 'relational outputs' of the encounter. Last, the central 'brown box' indicates the transformation process itself (and hides its 'technology').
Using the framework presented above: sketches of possible applications.
Consideration of relational goods helps push the economic discourse deeper into numerous important phenomena that cannot be adequately described by means of the usual economic concepts. Take for instance return migration, i.e. the tendency for migrant workers to go back to their birthplace, and increase their consumption. As such behaviours are hard to explain in terms of job opportunities, relative wages, or relative prices, some authors have assumed that coeteris paribus the utility from consumption is greater at home than elsewhere (see Dustmann, 1997, pp. 298-299) , or that utility is an increasing function of both (material) consumption and the number of friends or relatives in whose presence consumption occurs (see also Djiajic and Milbourne, 1988, pp. 337-338) . However, these ad hoc assumptions do not fit other patterns, such as Australia's internal migration toward the east coast, whose main driving force apparently is not job availability (see Stimson and Minnery, 1998, pp. 203-207) . Taking account of relational goods helps rationalise such a variety of trends. In the former case, upon their return migrants can put again to use relational capital regarding friends and relatives who did not move, thus obtaining both instrumental benefits (low-transaction-cost mutual help) and intrinsic benefits (relational consumption goods). In the second, high mobility of friends and relatives reduces the home attraction effect, and demand for relational goods is better satisfied by pursuing new relationships in a favourable social environment.
The framework developed above also adds new hints to the usual explanation that volunteering is partly an opportunity for investing in new skills or reputation, and partly a consumption activity (see Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987) . Indeed, by participating in a volunteer group people invest in human capital specific to other volunteers, who are self-selected as to pro-social intentions and dispositions. This makes interaction especially productive of relational consumption goods, either during the very accomplishment of service, or in formal and informal meetings. Furthermore, encounters with beneficiaries can also bring, apart from the satisfaction of doing good, the benefit of intense interpersonal communication.
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Next consider scientific research. Relational capital goods like mutual familiarity and understanding help in obtaining advise from colleagues for individual research projects, and increase the effectiveness of co-operation in carrying out joint projects, not to mention their favourable effects on the fruitfulness of seminar discussions. Moreover, relational capital may also contribute to the production of relational consumption goods (such as good humour during meetings and seminars), which add to the whole compensation package, thus contributing to discourage quits. A different domain where relational goods count a lot is associations, especially those with social and recreational purposes (see Iannaccone, 1992) . Indeed, member cohesiveness is often their most precious capital asset: the departure of a few key senior members, who share specific information (e.g. about the association's history) and affective bonds with most other members, may be very difficult to remedy by admitting new members. Moreover, relational consumption goods typically account for a large share of the benefits that involvement in an association ensures its members, as it would be revealed by the application of the mental test suggested above to a Sunday spent at a sporting club.
As already hinted at, depicting all parties in an interaction as co-producers is especially insightful in the case of services. In a guided sight-seeing tour clients contribute to the success or failure of the event, not only by keeping time schedules, but also by influencing (with their attitudes and interpersonal behaviour) the social environment they find themselves in, which is a crucial determinant of satisfaction. Similarly, the patient's cooperation in supplying information and complying with instructions is a precious input of health care. Observe that the patient's satisfaction largely depends on communicative/affective interaction with the personnel; or, in other words, on the set of relational goods produced and consumed during the provision of medical care (thanks to contributions from both sides). Furthermore, in personal care relational capital often plays a key role for the perceived quality of services delivered, and the intrinsic value of interaction: just think of moving frequently a child (an elderly person) from one nursery school (one nursing home) to another.
Another use of the framework presented above is for discussing the goals economic agents may have in mind when entering an encounter. In the case of an estate agent who is only interested in striking the best deal in selling a certain property, in order to compute the net benefit she obtains from encountering a customer one only has -to make it simple -to subtract from the agreed intermediation fee the cost of carrying out this deal (e.g. transportation costs, plus the reservation value of the services of her human capital), and then compare the result with the corresponding magnitude for the best alternative customer. In general, however, an interactant values an encounter according to all its inputs and outputs (certainly those contributed by -or accruing to -herself, but possibly also those concerning others, out of either fairness considerations, or benevolence, or envy, …). In particular, when deciding to encounter someone else, an agent can also have in mind: the consumption of relational goods (e.g. chatting with a friendly person while being served by that hair-dresser with whom one shares so many views) 43 ; and the accumulation of relation-specific human capital (so an otherwise unprofitable transaction -e.g. because the travel costs for meeting the seller are high relative to the quantity purchased -may allow the buyer to know more about a supplier who seems fit for becoming an important source of parts in the future; or volunteering to represent the company at a meeting may be an opportunity for improving one's image in the eyes of that important businessman who is going to be present). 44 interactions, when the other's investment is high, high investment in the relation is profitable, as the resulting probability of separation is low; viceversa, if the other invests little, low investment is preferable, since early termination of the relationship by either party is expected with high probability. 42 One may rightly wonder whether people are really so sophisticated when they consider volunteering. However, after experiencing it, people usually understand -or at least sense -most of the elements at stake. Freeman (1997) does not make the distinction between starting and continuing to volunteer, and thus draws from the empirical fact that most people start volunteering on request, the conclusion that volunteer labour is to be seen as a form of contribution to public goods under social pressure. 43 The latter example is mentioned by Adelman et al. (1994, p. 143) as one in which high levels of customer satisfaction are associated with the fact that service providers are ready to go beyond their basic role definition to become confidents. See also Bitner et al. (1990) . 44 Or else, the main goal of an interactant can be a change in the human capital of another interactant (in particular her convictions and preferences). Indeed, lobbying efforts affect policies not only through transmission Last, consideration of purposes and characteristics of the various economic interactions helps discuss institutions which are used to host them. For instance, impersonal electronic exchange fits security markets, since -thanks to other practices and institutions, such as standardisation of contracts, precautionary deposits, etc. -traders do not need to accumulate relation-specific human capital in order to make satisfactory transactions, so veritable encounters (i.e. personalised interactions) are not required. Instead, in industrial districts producing fashion goods, the numerous contracts among independent firms which secure completion of the various steps in the production chain of ever-changing models are potentially very costly. Not surprisingly, in this environment enduring personalised business relationships prevail, and significant relational capital is accumulated, thanks to the numerous opportunities for interaction between manufacturers (business and other associations, wine bars, family or friendship links); 45 if all this sounds too traditional, the venture capital industry displays equivalent features in the surroundings of Palo Alto. Interestingly, the relational characteristics of a trade are liable to change over time. When once upon a time stock traders met in Wall Street under a tree, modern security markets were quite similar to today's venture capital or investment banking businesses as to the importance of (personally transmitted) local information and of personal ties for carrying out transactions safely.
Conclusions.
In this paper, after a brief overview of the growing 'social economics' literature, I have proposed to view personalised interactions as veritable productive processes which are at the centre of economic life. This perspective assigns a key role to the notion of relational goods, i.e. intangible valuable entities that are inextricably associated with face-to-face 'encounters'. Relational goods comprise: 'relational consumption goods', i.e. the intrinsic rewards interactants derive from and 'consume' during an interaction; and 'relational capital goods' -various forms of relation specific human capital that impact on both the outcomes of conventional transactions conducted by the parties, and on the communicative/affective side of the interaction. To this aim I have sketched a scheme of an 'encounter' that is intended to serve as a semi-finished theoretical basis for modelling coherently the relational aspects of economic interactions (an example of this modelling is Antoci, Sacco and Vanin, 2003) . I have deliberately avoided to specify not only the preference structure of agents, but also their logic of action, so as to accommodate, potentially, not only conventional utility maximisation but also, say, procedural or expressive rationality.
In treating this matter I cannot conceal, to both myself and the readers, the obstacles that stand in front of any attempt at fruitfully extending economic reasoning to the domain of interpersonal relations: in particular extreme complexity and difficulties of measurement. Still I think that there is a value in trying hard. The reason is that there remain real phenomena that risk not to be even conceptualised in economic terms, and therefore are liable to be disregarded in individual, corporate, and government decision-making based on economic reasoning; and we all know that when in confronting a situation a significant element is disregarded, the search for efficiency is destined to seriously damage that element, in the attempt to obtain modest improvements in the prominent directions, and in such a way, to actively promote inefficiency. The natural environment analogy is specially insightful in this regard. Over the last decades we have reached a much greater awareness than before as to the need to include among the costs and benefits of individual or collective actions their ecological consequences. The time now has come that we also learn to account for those hidden costs and benefits of our choices that are associated with their impact on the social environment -which is no less important, both instrumentally and intrinsically, than the natural environment.
No doubt, interpersonal relations are particularly hard ground for economic policy, as it has been clearly stated by Yew-Kwang Ng (1975) . First of all, spontaneity is a crucial condition for high-quality relational interaction, while the outcomes of public intervention are almost by definition artificial. A second reason for caution is that it is not the government's duty to shape the forms of interaction in the business sphere, much less in family, friendship, or associational life. Were it to interfere in so delicate a matter, it would either waste money or unduly restrict the sphere of action of civil society. Still, there remains ample room for indirect public intervention: promoting actions that favour the accumulation of relational capital goods, and discouraging other actions which lead to their depletion. For instance social services (e.g. day care for children) can be so designed as to promote the creation of co-operative relationships among families, with effects not only on cost reduction, but also on the strengthening of ties among consumers (see for instance Normann, 1984, § 3.3.2) . Moreover, public authorities have some discretion in favouring a structure of retail trade that strengthens local connections (e.g. keeping commercial sites close to where people live, so they have the opportunity of regularly visiting nonof information and explicit or implicit exchanges between pressure groups and legislators, but also through changes in the latter's convictions. 45 On the relations between businessmen in industrial districts see Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger (1990) .
anonymous meeting places), or else in creating pedestrian areas and other meeting places that favour repeated personal interaction and so counter alienation. Job and residential mobility -which on the one hand contribute to better allocation of resources such as portable skills and dwellings, and the diffusion of ideas -on the other hand may lead to inefficient depletion of relational capital goods. Indeed, while in the presence of moderate mobility there remain nucleuses of lively social relationships capable of integrating both returning movers and newcomers, beyond a certain threshold only loose networks survive. Of course, responsibility over these matters is not primarily public, but there is a host of public decisions that have a bearing on this terrain.
The second channel by which greater awareness of relational goods and their creation (or dissipation) can make a difference, is cultural. Were the prevailing mental representation of the economic domain to be updated, so as to include relational goods among the concerns of household or company decision makers, innumerable choices would be affected: from housing, time schedules, the design of services, the organisation of work, up to interpersonal attitudes for business effectiveness. Indeed, that we are all so obsessed by relative consumption and individual success -the positional aims at the roots of the rat race that absorbs so many human and natural resources -is partly a social artefact: the most visible connection is with the working of the advertisement industry, that openly encourages such tendencies in order to boost consumption. The appreciation of relational goods is also inevitably subject to cultural influences; if not else, since confirmation by others is a strong reinforcer of personal convictions or predispositions. However, some encouraging changes are already occurring in management culture, as is witnessed by recent approaches that stress the centrality of interpersonal relations for company performance (see for instance Cohen and Prusak, 2001 ).
Taking interpersonal relations seriously is going to entail not only practical implications that we can only partially envisage now, but also new challenges for economic theorising. On the one hand, as we discussed at length, new entities that we felt previously authorised to neglect, must be accounted for. On the other, as the conceptualisation of economic interaction is modified, the received view of what constitutes appropriate economic behaviour also needs to be updated: as Solow (1999, p. 7) remarks, in these matters " [t] he simple combination of rationality and individual greed that provides the behavioural foundation for most of economics will go only that far".
